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NOTES AND COMMENTS

though the holder had actual knowledge of the reacquisition. This view
is supported by that language of §66 which was so completely disregarded in Ray v. Livingston.
The Negotiable Instruments Law is now being revised by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Law Institute, as a part of their Commercial Code project.8 4
This problem should be dealt with explicitly so that there will be no
question but what an intermediate indorser will be held to that liability
which he assumes.35
ALFRED D. WARD
Criminal Law-North Carolina Bastardy Statute-Support
of Illegitimate Children
In State v. Stiles,' the defendant was indicted for willful failure to
support his illegitimate child. In order to secure a conviction under
this indictment, it is necessary that the State prove two elements. First,
that the defendant is the father of the illegitimate child, and second,
2
that his failure to support the child was willful.

The prosecutrix's testimony as to the conception presented sufficient
evidence on the point of paternity to support the jury's finding that
the defendant was the father of the child. Since the defendant admitted
having failed to support the child, it was only incumbent upon the prosecution to show that his failure to support was accompanied by a willful
intent. When the State proved that the defendant had known of the
prosecutrix's pregnant condition and her requests for "aid" even before
the birth of the child, the jury was fully justified in finding that his
subsequent failure to support the child was willful, without justification
or excuse. However, had the State failed to establish the requisite;
willful intent, the defendant would have been guilty of no crime, since
the statute makes willfullness a necessary ingredient of the offense. 8
The present statute4 under which the defendant was indicted superseded the old Bastardy Proceedings. Bastardy Proceedings5 were civil
" See HANDBOOK AND PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 143 (1944).

" It has been learned through correspondence that the revision in its present
tentative form includes a provision discharging an intermediate indorser on reacquisition by a prior party. This draft is, of course, "subject to change without
notice," and the writer hopes that such will be the fate of the provision in question.
2228
N. C. 137, 44 S. E. 2d 728 (1947).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §49-2.
' State v. Vanderlip, 225 N. C. 610, 35 S. E. 2d 885 (1945) ; State v. Hayden,
224 N. C. 779, 32 S. E. 2d 333 (1944) ; State v. Allen, 224 N. C. 530, 31 S. E. 2d
530 (1944) ; State v. Moore, 220 N. C. 535, 11 S. E. 2d 660 (1941) ; State v.
McLamb, 214 N. C. 322, 199 S. E. 81 (1938); State v. Tarlton, 208 N. C. 734,
182 S. E. 481 (1935) ; State v. Tyson, 208 N. C. 231, 180 S. E. 85 (1935).
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943)

§49-2.

N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §265.
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in nature and to secure a court decree for the maintenance and support
of -the child, it was only necessary that the State show by the preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was the father of the child.
Under the present laws, however, the establishment of paternity only
satisfies the proof of one of the two requisite elements, and since it is a
criminal statute, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt rather
than by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant willfully
failed to support the child. The defendant enters the trial with a presumption of innocence, and this includes innocence from any willful
failure on his part to support his child. 6 The failure to support may be
an evidential fact tending to prove his willful intent. However, the
judge will commit reversible error to charge the jury that the mere7
finding of a failure to support gives rise to a presumption of willfulness.
In the principal case, the judge instructed the jury that the defendant
was indicted for.Bastardy and that North Carolina had a statute which
made it a crime for a man to have intercourse with a woman and become the father of an illegitimate child. He later stated that the State
was not relying on this statute. He further instructed the jury that
the crime included a failure to support and pay medical expenses incurred when the child was born. Considering the first part of these
instructions, the jury was at liberty to render a verdict of guilty based
solely upon the fact that they found the defendant to be the father of the
child, and yet no statute exists in this State making such conduct a
criminal offense. 8 The Judge's attempted curative statement that the
State was not relying on this statute, at most only served to confuse
the jury, and not to lessen the prejudice already heaped upon the defendant. The .instructions concerning medical expenses were incorrect
as a matter of law, for willful failure to provide such expenses is not a
criminal offense although the court may require provision therefor upon
the defendant's conviction.9
The trial judge's error illustrates one of the many difficulties which
may arise in the application of this statute. The Supreme Court of
North Carolina more than once has criticized this act for its ambiguity
and impossibility of satisfactory construction.' 0
The legislature has provided that the court may order the defendant
to pay the mother the necessary medical expenses incurred in bearing
the child. However, this order can, be issued only after the defendant
* State v. Spellman, 210 N. C. -271, 186 S. E. 322 (1936) ; State v. Cook, 207
N. C. 261, 176 S. E. 757 (1934).
*State v. Cook, 207 N_ C. 261, 176 S. E. 757 (1934).
B State v. Tyson, 208 N. C. 231, 108 S. E. 85 (1935).
* State v. Summerlin, 224 N. C. 178, 29 S. E. 2d 462 (1944).
1* State v. White, 225 N. C. 351, 34 S. E. 2d 139 (1945) ; State v. Summerlin,
224 N. C. 178, 29 S. E. 2d 462 (1944); State v. Dill, 224 N. C. 57, 29 S. E. 2d
145 (1944).
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has been found guilty of a willful failure to support the child. Medical
expenses are no part of a child's support." The reputed father is under
no duty to support a dead child. Therefore, the mother apparently has
no grounds upon which to bring an action under the statute to collect
such medical expenses when the child dies at birth. 12 It is doubtful
that the legislature intended this result in view of the fact that the
former statute-1 afforded her compensation for such expenses, and
further considering that the legislature in the present act expressly
recognizes the father's duty to pay for such expenses.
The difficulty of interpreting the legislative intent concerning medical expenses again arises when such expenses are considered in light of
the statute of limitations.' 4 Payments for the support of the child by
the reputed father within three years of birth will extend the statute
of limitationsY5 This is allowed upon the theory that the payment by
the reputed father is an acknowledgment of his issue. But since medical
expenses incurred in birth are not a part of the child's support, payment
of these alone will apparently not extend the statute in favor of the
mother.' 6 If the basis of this extension is the acknowledgment by the
reputed father of his issue, could it be reasonably contended that payment of medical expenses incurred in birth is any less an acknowledgment than payments made to support the child?
The statute of limitations in part reads, "Proceedings under this
article to establish paternity of such child may be instituted at any time
within three years next after the birth of the child, and not thereafter."''
To understand why the legislature restricted the application of the statute of limitations to proceedings to establish paternity, it is necessary to
consider the general purpose of the chapter and the operation of the
diverse sections within it. The act expressly recognizes that the statutory crime consists of two elements, one, the establishment of paternity,
and two, proof of willful failure to -support. Affirmative proof of the
first is a condition precedent to allowing a verdict of guilty upon the
second. Hence, if proof of paternity is barred there can be no action
for failure to support. But, if paternity is established within the allowed
three years, the legislature must have intended that the State be able to
prosecute the action at anytime within the first fourteen years of the
child's life. This should be true since failure to support is a continuing
crime. I s The provisions for bringing preliminary proceedings would
11
State v. Summerlin, 224 N. C. 178, 29 S.E. 2d 462 (1944).
's

This issue has not yet been decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court.

N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §273.
21 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) § 49-4.

'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §49-4.
10 This issue has not yet been decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §49-4.
"sSee Mr. Justice Barnhill, dissenting in State v. Dill, 224 N. C. 57, 29 S.E.
2d 145 (1944).
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be meaningless if the three year statute of limitations is construed to
bar all action under this act. For, if this were so, even after the establishment of paternity in a preliminary proceeding, it would still be
incumbent upon the State to bring an action for failure to support within
three years from birth. Since paternity may be establishd in the prose.cution for failure to support, there would be no purpose in having preliminary proceedings if all action under the act is barred three years
after birth. It would seem that if the legislature had intended this
result they would have said prosecutions under this article are barred
rather than designating specifically preliminary proceedings.
A proviso is written into the statute of limitations which is as follows: "provided however that when the reputed father has acknowledged
paternity of the child by payments for the support of such child within
three years from the date of birth thereof, and not later, then, in such
case, prosecution may be brought under the provisions of such sections
within three years from the date of such acknowledgment of paternity
of such child by the reputed.father thereof."'19 The proviso by its own
language limits its operation to the particular case of acknowledgment
by payments, and does not act as a restriction upon the three year statute
of limitations. It is intended to give additional rights, and not to limit
those already given. Construed thus, the proviso gives the mother the
additional right to have the defendant prosecuted for failure to support,
even though the statute of limitations prevents her from establishing
paternity in a preliminary hearing. Since the father has affirmatively
recognized his child, it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature
intended that the mother should be given a further opportunity to force
the father to perform his duty to the child.
In final analysis, the mother, if she establishes paternity in a preliminary proceedings, is given fourteen years from the birth of the child
to have the State institute action for failure to support; however, if she
fails to establish such paternity in preliminary proceedings within the
allowed time, the State must institute action for failure to support within
the extended period of three years from the last payment in support
20
made within three years from birth or the action is forever barred.
The North Carolina Supreme Court to date has not accepted this
21
interpretation of the statute of limitations. In State v. Bradshaw,
22
the court held that the statute of limitations (which read at that time,
"Proceedings under this act may be instituted at any time within three
years after birth of the child and not thereafter") barred any action
I N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §49-4.
2' State v. Dill. 224 N. C. 57, 29 S. E. 2d 145 (1944).

This would seem to be

in accord with the separate dissenting views presented by Justices Seawell and
Barnhill.
2-

214 N. C. 5, 197 S.E. 564 (1938).

-"N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §276(c).
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under the statute after the expiration of three years from the birth of the
child. In 1939 the statute of limitations was amended to its present
form. 23 The effect of the 1939 amendment on the former statute of
limitations was first considered in State v. Killian, where the court said:
"This section (the former statute of limitations) however was definitely
changed by Section 3 of Chapter 217 Public Laws 1939 (the present
statute of limitations) which limited the application thereof to proceedings to establish the paternity of such child." 24 Considering this statement, it is difficult to understand why the court has held that "the only
material change wrought by the particular amendatory proviso was to
extend the time within which prosecutions may be brought when the
reputed father has acknowledged his child by payments...." 25 Therefore, today the law in North Carolina requires that prosecutions be commenced within three years of birth or they are barred by the statute of
limitations, unless the proviso is made operative because of payments in
acknowledgment, in which case the maximum limit for commencing
the action would be six years from birth.
A father's initial gift to an illegitimate child is universal condemnation. This irreparable disservice should not be further perpetuated by
allowing the father to escape the financial responsibility of his wrongful
act because of ambiguity in our law. Nor could the legislature have
intended such a result. The legislature has expressly distinguished
proceedings and prosecutions, but, if there be any uncertainty, society
and common decency dictate that it should be construed in favor of the
unfortunate child.
THOMAS A. WADDEN, JR.
Federal Jurisdiction-joinder of Non-Federal Claim
with Federal Question
Plaintiff brought an action against FBI agents to recover damages
allegedly resulting from an unlawful search and seizure of the plaintiff's
property and from a deprivation of his liberty and property without
due process of law in violation of his immunities guaranteed by the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The
district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the
complaint failed to state a federal claim for which relief could be
granted, and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.- The Supreme
Court reversed 2 on the grounds that the plaintiff had clearly and in
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §49-4.
N'
"State v. Killian, 217 N. C. 339, 341, 7 S. E. 2d 702, 703 (1940).
2'224 N. C. 57, 29 S. E. 2d 462 (1944) ; see State v. Killian, 217 N. C. 339,.
341, 7 S.E. 2d 702, 703 (1940).
Bell v. Hood, 150 F. 2d 96 (C. C. A. 9th 1945).
'Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1946). Mr. Chief Justice Stone and Mr. Justice
Burton dissented on the ground that "The district court is without jurisdiction as

